

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP83S00855R000100140001-9

State Dept. review
completed

25X1

DIA review completed.

Approved For Release 2008/07/29 : CIA-RDP83S00855R000100140001-9



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret

25X1

The Namibian Settlement Process: Obstacles and Regional Implications

25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON

STATE DEPT REVIEW COMPLETED

DIA review completed.

Secret

ALA 82-10120X
August 1982

Copy

23

Page Denied



Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret

25X1

The Namibian Settlement Process: Obstacles and Regional Implications

25X1

An Intelligence Assessment

25X1

This assessment was written by [redacted]
and the appendix was prepared by [redacted]
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Southern Africa Division,
ALA, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

This assessment was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council and the Directorate of
Operations. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

ALA 82-10120X
August 1982

Secret

25X1

**The Namibian Settlement
Process: Obstacles and
Regional Implications**

25X1

Key Judgments

The pace of the Namibian talks has quickened recently, largely as a result of South Africa's initiative in presenting an accelerated timetable for a settlement and its new flexibility on a number of Namibian issues. But Pretoria's demand that a settlement be linked to withdrawal of Cubans from Angola poses a formidable obstacle.

Although important details on the cease-fire and other aspects of the UN plan still need to be worked out, we believe that the remaining differences over strictly Namibian issues are not insurmountable. Any one of the unresolved issues, however, provides ample opportunity for either side to procrastinate or even to break off talks. Unexpected military developments could also derail the settlement talks.

The prospects for agreement on the withdrawal of Cubans are far less certain. The critical issue is whether the Angolan regime is willing or able to send a sufficient number of Cubans home and in a manner that satisfies Pretoria's demand that Cuban forces be withdrawn. South Africa appears uncompromising in its current demand for the verified withdrawal of all Cuban troops. It may eventually settle for less—although we believe it will insist upon the departure of considerably more than half of the 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban troops that we estimate are in Angola.

Pretoria recognizes that the political strength of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has not been diminished by South Africa's military operations during the past year, and this, in our view, underlies South Africa's linking of a Namibian settlement to withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. The Botha government probably believes that it needs the political ammunition of a Cuban withdrawal to defuse a domestic rightwing reaction to a probable SWAPO electoral victory in Namibia.

Although the issue of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has remained largely on the periphery of the negotiations, calculations about UNITA's strength relative to that of the Angolan regime heavily influence the thinking of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) about the Cuban issue.

*Information available as of 17 August 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

Secret

ALA 82-10120X
August 1982

Secret

25X1

We believe that Luanda could not afford to lose more than 5,000 to 7,500 members of the total Cuban military force without suffering appreciable territorial losses to UNITA.

Luanda probably has neither the desire nor the ability to reach a reconciliation with Savimbi at this time. Moreover, the Frontline States for the most part support Angola's view that Savimbi is a "traitor" and a South African "puppet" and are unlikely to press reconciliation on Luanda. South Africa, on the other hand, views UNITA as a valuable source of leverage that costs very little. Consequently, we expect the UNITA issue to remain in the background as negotiations continue on Namibia and Cuban withdrawal.

The manner in which the Cubans would withdraw is also important to both Luanda and Pretoria. Angola, with strong support from its African and Communist backers, has repeatedly rejected any explicit linkage between a Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal, insisting that the Cuban issue is an internal Angolan matter and that the Cuban troops would leave as a natural consequence of a settlement. In view of repeated South African public statements, however, we expect the South Africans will insist that they be allowed to state publicly that the Cubans will withdraw before beginning implementation of a Namibian settlement.

A Namibian settlement that included the withdrawal of substantial numbers of Cuban troops would be widely viewed as a major success for US policy toward southern Africa. For such a settlement to occur, however, we believe that the United States is likely to be pressed to make several formal and informal commitments to the various parties—promises which could have long-term consequences for US interests. The Angolans probably would demand assurances about Western economic assistance and future South African behavior. The South Africans, in return for concessions on the Cuban issue or on policies toward their neighbors, might insist on improved relations with the United States. For example, in addition to wanting greater US tolerance for the pace of racial reform in South Africa, they have expressed interest in closer cooperation on nuclear matters and a relaxation of US restraints on trade in items that could be used for military purposes.

Secret

Secret

25X1

If the Cuban issue proves intractable and the settlement talks collapse, we believe the South Africans, disclaiming responsibility for the failure, will proceed with an "internal" settlement—that is, holding elections next year that exclude SWAPO and the UN—with the expectation of some degree of support from the West. The South Africans might decide to conduct military operations of unprecedented scale in southern Angola. Such operations would be aimed at inflicting a humiliating defeat on SWAPO and punishing its Angolan and Cuban backers. The South Africans may also decide to increase their support to Savimbi's insurgency.

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
The Namibian Situation	1
Angolan Issues	3
The Military Equation	3
A Political Complication	4
Key Players and Their Interests	5
South Africa	5
Angola	6
Frontline States	7
SWAPO	8
Cuba	8
Soviet Union	8
Implications for the United States	8
If a Settlement Is Achieved	8
If an Indeterminate Outcome Occurs	9
If Negotiations Fail	10
 Appendix	
Recent Military Developments	13

Secret

Secret

25X1

The Namibian Settlement Process: Obstacles and Regional Implications

25X1

Introduction

The situation in southern Africa has changed markedly in recent months as diplomatic activity has accelerated on Namibia and related issues. In early May, South Africa told the United States that it was willing to move rapidly to implement the UN plan for Namibia and to drop some of its earlier demands concerning the size and functions of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) and assurances of UN impartiality. South Africa has also reversed its position on the mechanics of electing a preindependence constitutional assembly, agreeing to choose between single-member constituencies and proportional representation—either of which the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has said it will accept. Meanwhile, the Frontline States, particularly Tanzania and Zambia, now appear to be pressing SWAPO to be accommodating in the negotiations.

But Pretoria has coupled its newfound flexibility on Namibian issues with its insistence that Cuban military forces be withdrawn from Angola simultaneously with the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. While the pace of US-Angolan talks on the Cuban issue has quickened, the prospects for agreement are far from certain. The critical question is whether Angola is willing or able to send a sufficient number of Cubans home and in a manner that satisfies Pretoria's demands.

The issue of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) has remained largely in the background, but calculations about UNITA's strength relative to that of the Angolan regime heavily influence negotiations on a Cuban withdrawal. Savimbi's insurgency is feared by the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and highly valued by Pretoria as a source

¹ The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Nigeria has periodically participated in Frontline deliberations.

of leverage against Angola. An accommodation between the MPLA and UNITA probably would be required to end Luanda's dependence on the massive Cuban presence.

25X1

The Namibian Situation

Aggressive South African military operations into southern Angola during the past year have put SWAPO on the defensive militarily. South African attacks have driven Angolan forces out of a portion of south-central Angola, creating a de facto buffer zone in southern Angola consisting of inhospitable territory to the west, a South African-controlled area in the center, and UNITA's stronghold in the east. SWAPO has been largely unable to infiltrate into northern Namibia and, despite a few well-publicized attacks earlier this year, its military activity has remained well below 1980 levels.

25X1

Pretoria's military success, in our view, has not eroded SWAPO's political strength within Namibia. Mos observers believe—and we concur with this judgment—that SWAPO would win an internationally supervised election. Pretoria probably shares this view.

We believe that Pretoria's recognition of SWAPO's political strength underlies the linking of a Namibian settlement to a withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. The South Africans have argued publicly that if the Cubans remain in Angola after the South African troops are withdrawn, the Namibians will be intimidated and thus vote in favor of SWAPO. We believe,

25X1

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Secret

25X1

however, that Pretoria's calculations are driven primarily by its own political concerns, both domestic and international:

- The Botha government knows, in our view, that its rightwing critics would react harshly to a SWAPO election victory, and Pretoria probably believes that it needs the political ammunition of a Cuban withdrawal to offset the onus of "losing" Namibia to the SWAPO "terrorists."
- If negotiations founder on the Cuban issue—as hardliners in Pretoria undoubtedly hope—the South Africans could proceed with their often-stated intention to hold elections next March or April, without SWAPO participation and UN supervision. Pretoria would hope that its flexibility on specific aspects of the UN plan would enable it to avoid blame for the failure of the negotiations.

Thus, we believe that the South Africans view a Cuban withdrawal as a necessary domestic sweetener to accompany the bitter pill of an international settlement in Namibia. They also see the Cuban issue as a means of deflecting Western reaction in the event that negotiations collapse and South Africa pursues an "internal" solution—a possible outcome that the South Africans have raised frequently with US officials. [redacted]

While numerous details on the cease-fire and other aspects of the UN plan still need to be worked out, our assessment is that the remaining differences over these issues are not insurmountable, provided both sides continue to negotiate in good faith. Any of the unresolved issues relating to the UN plan, as well as questions that appear to be settled or unrelated to the negotiations, could provide ample opportunity for either side to procrastinate or even to break off talks, but we do not believe this will occur unless the Cuban issue remains unresolved. [redacted]

Unexpected military developments could also derail the settlement talks. Although there had been no evidence of new Angolan or SWAPO moves southward, the South Africans moved mechanized infantry units into southern Angola in mid-July and followed with air attacks. A letter on 20 July from the South

African Government to the UN Secretary General, warning that Pretoria would retaliate if SWAPO carried out alleged plans to increase military activity, appears to have been a pretext for operations already under way. [redacted]

Angolan Issues

The Military Equation. The MPLA regime in Luanda depends on the 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban military personnel to buttress the Angolan Army of roughly 30,000 men.² In Luanda, the Cubans help protect hardline Marxist ideologues who dominate the MPLA government from coup attempts by a more moderate black nationalist faction. In the Cabinda enclave, Cuban troops guard Angola's vital oil production facilities. In southern Angola, Cubans man ground and air defenses along the Mocamedes rail line, which serves as the main line of defense against deep South African incursions. The Cubans also provide essential support to the Angolan Army's operations against UNITA. [redacted]

Although Luanda claims that the Cubans are present solely to protect Angola from South Africa, we believe that relatively few Cubans—perhaps 2,000 to 3,000 men—are dedicated to defense against South African attacks. We believe Luanda's principal security threat is UNITA, with a total force of roughly 20,000 men, of whom we estimate some 10,000 to 15,000 to be armed combatants and the rest "auxiliaries" in various stages of training.³ [redacted]


² Estimates of Cuban force levels are based primarily on analysis of air and ship activity between Cuba and Angola. [redacted]

³ Reliable information on UNITA force levels is limited. In 1980 and again in 1981 Savimbi claimed he had some 25,000 men, of whom he said around 10,000 were "regulars" and the rest "guerrillas." [redacted] the press has indicated that some of the "guerrillas" are unarmed trainees or "auxiliaries." Newsmen who have been in contact with UNITA have given totals somewhat lower than those provided by Savimbi. Our rough estimate that UNITA has around 20,000 men thus is based on the assumption that Savimbi was overstating his strength to some extent. [redacted]

Secret

25X1
25X1
25X1

Secret



UNITA forces continue to operate relatively freely in southeastern Angola, where they dominate rural areas and hold several towns. The insurgents also operate in the more heavily populated central part of the country—up to and including the Benguela railroad, which they sabotage routinely—but they do not control urban areas in the central region. While UNITA has had some success in expanding its area of activity in recent years, it has not made major gains. Although little direct fighting between Cuban and UNITA forces has occurred since 1978—a year in which

Cuban casualties mounted as a result of UNITA's practice of targeting Cuban personnel—Cuban troops are essential to maintaining the current standoff because they provide logistics support to the Angolan Army and serve as a deterrent to more conventional UNITA operations.

If all of the Cuban military personnel in Angola were withdrawn, it is our judgment that UNITA probably would be able to gain control over virtually all the territory south of the Benguela railroad probably

Secret

Secret

within six months to a year of a Cuban withdrawal. In addition, it is not certain that a new military equilibrium would be established even at this point, given the likely impact these UNITA gains would have on the Angolan military's morale and on the political situation in Luanda. A Cuban withdrawal and major UNITA military gains would, in our judgment, greatly weaken the hardline Marxist faction that currently dominates the Angolan Government and armed forces and could lead members of the nationalist faction to seek an accommodation with UNITA. []

We believe that no more than 5,000 to 7,500 Cuban personnel could be withdrawn without appreciably changing the current military situation. If more than that number were withdrawn, UNITA would be likely to make significant gains, even if its South African support were withdrawn as part of a Namibian settlement. We base our judgment on cumulative reporting on the activities of the various military forces active in Angola in recent years and on the pattern of the fighting. Engagements between UNITA and government forces have steadily increased over the period, and despite substantial Cuban assistance to the Angolans, the size and capabilities of UNITA have grown. UNITA has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to take individual towns when they are not protected by significant garrisons, although it has not been able to hold them in the face of a large, Cuban-Angolan counterattack. []

A Political Complication. The manner in which the Cubans are withdrawn is also an important issue. Angola has rejected, publicly and repeatedly, any explicit linkage between a Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal, adamantly insisting that the Cuban issue is an internal Angolan matter and that the Cuban troops would leave as a natural consequence of a Namibian settlement. []

We believe that Luanda is at least partially bound by its own rhetoric and probably would require some way around an explicit coupling of the Cuban and Namibian issues, even if it agreed to a Cuban withdrawal. The Frontline States, as well as the Soviets and Cubans, have strongly supported Angola's rejection of explicit linkage, although some Frontline leaders admit privately to US officials that the Cuban issue must be addressed now. []

South African leaders, on the other hand, have insisted publicly on an overt and formal linkage between a Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal; Prime Minister Botha stated in mid-June that the "mass of Cubans must go" and that "their departure must be seen to be happening." On the basis of this and similar public and private statements by South African leaders, we believe that Botha and his like-minded colleagues view a publicized Cuban withdrawal as critical to countering a rightwing backlash to a SWAPO election victory. [] 25X1

Key Players and Their Interests

The prospects for the Western-sponsored endeavor to induce South Africa to cede control over Namibia and for US efforts to persuade Angola to reduce or end its reliance on Cuban troops depend ultimately on how the various parties view their concerns in the region. An assessment—necessarily somewhat speculative—of what we believe are the key players' essential interests follows. [] 25X1

South Africa. Pretoria claims that its new sense of urgency on settling the Namibia problem "one way or the other" stems from growing domestic political and economic pressure. South African officials have told Contact Group members that the longer the Namibia issue remains unsolved the greater the risk that the new South African Conservative Party, which split off from the ruling National Party in March 1982, will be able to exploit the issue to undermine National Party solidarity.⁴ The South Africans have also said that the financial burden of maintaining control in Namibia, which costs about \$600 million per year for economic assistance and another \$400 million for military operations, is becoming intolerable for their slumping economy. [] 25X1

Although these factors have probably influenced Pretoria's thinking, we believe that South Africa's shift stems primarily from a belief that the time is now ripe either to obtain an acceptable resolution of the Namibia question or at least to gain stronger Western support for its position if negotiations fail. If an [] 25X1

⁴ The Western Contact Group includes Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany—the sponsors of the Namibian settlement plan contained in UN Resolution 435. []

25X1

Secret

25X1

Secret

international settlement is achieved, Botha would be able to justify to his public any security risks entailed in SWAPO's accession to power by pointing to Cuban withdrawal from Angola. If, however, a settlement is not achieved, Botha would be able to claim that South Africa is not to blame for the failure of its "sincere" effort to negotiate. Pretoria could then proceed with an "internal" settlement, hoping that the West will look more sympathetically on such a settlement, despite repeated statements to the contrary by members of the Contact Group. []

Pretoria, in our view, is likely to remain firm on the Cuban issue. South Africa has appeared uncompromising in its current demand for the verified withdrawal of all Cuban troops. On the basis of past tough South African bargaining tactics, however, and because Pretoria's domestic political requirements could be met by less than a total Cuban withdrawal, we believe it may eventually settle for less. We believe, nevertheless, that it will insist on the departure of considerably more than half of the 20,000 to 25,000 Cuban troops we believe are actually in Angola. Moreover, we also expect South African leaders, with an eye to their domestic critics, to insist that they be allowed to state publicly, and before beginning implementation of a Namibian settlement, that agreement has been reached on a Cuban withdrawal. []

South Africa has stated publicly that it would not be a party to any settlement that "betrays" Savimbi by abandoning UNITA to Cuban forces in Angola. For Pretoria, UNITA is not simply a bargaining chip vis-a-vis SWAPO, but a critical means of pursuing broader regional goals. UNITA serves South African purposes by destabilizing a hostile regime in Angola and providing a useful counter to Luanda's support for the African National Congress (ANC), the principal South African insurgent group. Angola serves as

the ANC's principal training area; ANC guerrillas receive military and terrorist training from Cuban and Soviet instructors, and probably from East German personnel as well. Consequently, UNITA will remain a valuable source of leverage for the South Africans even if there is a Namibian settlement. []

Angola. Most Angolans almost certainly would like to see a Namibian settlement to end South African attacks on Angola and rid themselves of the burden of supporting SWAPO. []

[] Angolans also want to improve relations with the West, particularly the United States, in the hope of gaining assistance for their devastated economy. Many Angolan leaders probably would like to reduce the Soviet-Cuban presence in the long run, if only to end Luanda's hard currency payments for Communist support. []

The factionalized MPLA leadership appears unable, however, to address decisively the related issues of a Cuban withdrawal and reconciliation with UNITA.

[] the dominant, mulatto-led group tends to be dogmatically Marxist and pro-Soviet and has rejected the notion of a negotiated compromise with UNITA. Moreover, we believe the massive Soviet-Cuban presence ensures the hardliners' dominant position in the regime and serves as a hedge against black nationalists in the party or the armed forces. Cuban troops intervened to keep former Prime Minister Neto in power when a black nationalist leader, Nito Alves, attempted a coup in 1977. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

***Deteriorating Economic
and Social Conditions in Angola***

Luanda has been unable to reverse the steady economic decline that started when Portugal granted the country independence in 1975. Shortages of food and other necessities are frequent, and rationing is common. Near-famine conditions may exist in some parts of the country.

The growing problems of the Angolan economy are reflected most acutely in the agricultural sector. Once the world's fourth-largest coffee exporter, Angola now produces about one-tenth of the coffee it did in the early 1970s. Despite its suitability for a wide range of crops, only 2 percent of the arable land is cultivated. Managers and skilled workers are scarce, and corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies are pervasive. Angola now imports 90 percent of its food.

Only oil production—the government's principal foreign exchange earner—has been maintained at preindependence levels. But the recently falling international prices and demand for oil have reduced government revenues below the level required to pay for Soviet and Cuban military advisers and equipment, leaving no funds available for reconstructing the collapsing economy.

The Angolans have been unable to get the type of assistance from their Communist backers that they need to arrest their economic slide. The USSR has extended only miniscule amounts of aid for fisheries and agriculture, and \$100 million in East European aid for agricultural and marine development has hardly been tapped. Nor have the roughly 10,000 Communist economic technicians, mostly Cubans, now in Angola been able to fill the gap left by the 350,000 Portuguese workers who departed at independence. The need for development assistance and expertise has been a major factor in Angola's interest in improving relations with the West, particularly the United States.

Although dos Santos is now willing to discuss the Cuban issue with US officials, the question of UNITA remains largely unaddressed. In view of the MPLA's internal divisions, we believe that Luanda has ruled out any negotiations with UNITA's leadership at least until the adroit and charismatic Savimbi is removed from the scene. The Angolans might demand, however, that the West and South Africa abandon Savimbi as the price for Cuban withdrawal.

25X1

Frontline States. Reporting from US Embassies in southern Africa indicates that the Frontline States, particularly Tanzania and Zambia, appreciate the opportunity to achieve a Namibian settlement that is now before them and want to persuade SWAPO to overcome its suspicions. Although each of the Frontline States has sought aid from Communist states, we believe the black leaders want to avoid an increase in the Soviet and Cuban presence that would accompany a major expansion of the SWAPO insurgency. We are uncertain, however, about the Frontline's determination or ability to put real pressure on SWAPO as the need arises. Frontline States were unwilling or unable to budge SWAPO earlier this year in its rejection of the Contact Group's electoral proposals. Moreover, if an obstinate SWAPO is strongly supported by the Soviets, there is little the Frontline can do, since pro-Soviet hardliners in Luanda probably could prevent MPLA moderates from applying pressure on SWAPO.

25X1

While the Frontline leaders have stoutly supported Angola's rejection of any linkage between Namibia and Cuban withdrawal, we believe most would go along with a simultaneous withdrawal of the bulk of the Cuban troops from Angola and the withdrawal of

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

South African troops from Namibia during the settlement's implementation. But the Frontline leaders are unlikely to press this position on either Luanda or the Soviets, since they contend that the Cuban issue is an internal Angolan matter. The Frontline is even more reluctant to raise the UNITA question with Luanda, also viewing it as an internal Angolan matter and perhaps seeing the potential for setting an undesirable precedent for such members as Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which face troublesome armed opposition groups of their own. [REDACTED]

SWAPO. Although SWAPO probably recognizes that it can ultimately take power in Namibia only through a negotiated settlement, SWAPO officials frequently express their deep suspicions of the South Africans and of recent Western efforts to promote a settlement. SWAPO undoubtedly suspects that Pretoria's sudden flexibility on Namibian issues conceals a South African plan somehow to manipulate the transition to independence and deny SWAPO a political victory. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nevertheless, if arrangements are agreed on that are strongly supported by the Frontline States—and not opposed by the Soviet Union—SWAPO probably would go along despite its misgivings. [REDACTED]

Cuba. The Cuban troop presence in Angola, soon to enter its eighth year, enables Havana to gain hard currency, employ surplus labor, and highlight Cuba's commitment to the "liberation struggle" against South Africa. Nonetheless, military service in Angola—performed largely by mobilized reservists—has become increasingly onerous and unpopular. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although we believe Havana would be reluctant to pull out as part of a Western-guaranteed package, Cuba might be willing to withdraw its forces as part of a larger arrangement, perhaps including some bilateral accommodation with the United States. [REDACTED]

Soviet Union. The Soviets, in our view, see important geopolitical benefits in their continued involvement in Angola. Angola is the only point on the West African coast where the USSR enjoys guaranteed air and naval access. Angola also remains a useful symbol of Moscow's superpower status and of its willingness and capability to project power to distant shores in support of its friends. [REDACTED]

A number of diplomatic and other sources have reported repeated Soviet efforts to obstruct a Western-brokered Namibian settlement—especially one that is coupled with a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. We do not believe the Soviets would try openly to block a Namibian settlement endorsed by the black African states, but they could use their substantial influence within the Angolan Government to prevent Luanda from asking for a Cuban troop withdrawal. The Soviets may also be apprehensive about what might happen if negotiations fail, in view of the possibility of having to bail out a weak client state under even greater military pressure from the South Africans. On balance, we believe the Soviets probably will encourage SWAPO and Angolan hardliners and others who are distrustful of the Western-led effort, but will not openly attempt to sabotage the negotiations. [REDACTED]

Implications for the United States

The effect of the settlement process on US interests would depend on whether the current negotiations lead to a successful settlement, an indeterminate outcome with negotiations continuing in some form, or a collapse of talks followed by South Africa's implementation of an "internal" solution. [REDACTED]

If a Settlement Is Achieved. A Namibian settlement that included the withdrawal of Cuban troops would be widely viewed as a major success for US policy toward southern Africa. A conclusion to the seemingly endless negotiations over Namibia would be greatly welcomed by the black African states, despite any

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

25X1

discomfort they might feel over the coupling of a Namibian settlement with a Cuban withdrawal. While it would undoubtedly be apprehensive over the prospect of black rule in Namibia, Pretoria would derive significant political benefits from forcing the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola and removing a major obstacle to a South African rapprochement with the West. []

The only clear losers would be the Soviets and the Cubans. A negotiated Namibian settlement, especially one coupled with a Cuban withdrawal, would be a particularly sharp rebuff to Soviet policy and would undermine Soviet interests in the region. []

For such a settlement to occur, with its undeniable returns to the United States, we believe the United States is likely to be pressed to make a number of formal and informal commitments to the various parties, promises which could have long-term consequences for United States interests:

- Angolan acquiescence in the departure of enough Cubans to satisfy the South Africans probably would require firm assurances about Western economic assistance and future South African behavior, particularly with respect to UNITA.
- Pretoria most likely would tie any concessions it made on the size of Cuban withdrawal and South Africa's policies toward its neighbors to US flexibility on major bilateral issues. In addition to wanting greater US tolerance for the pace of racial reform in South Africa, Pretoria has expressed interest in closer cooperation on nuclear matters and a relaxation of US restraints on trade on "gray area" items that could be used for military purposes.
- South Africa also has raised the question of a development fund for an independent Namibia to replace Pretoria's annual economic subsidy of about \$600 million. In addition, Pretoria probably would ask for US intelligence assistance in verifying a Cuban withdrawal. []

Thus, the successful conclusion of US efforts to promote a negotiated settlement could also result in a closer identification of the United States with South

Africa, possibly coupled with an informal commitment to the black African states to restrain Pretoria in its policies toward its neighbors. If South Africa did not moderate its regional policies—a strong possibility, particularly in view of its substantial and continuing support for the antigovernment insurgency that threatens President Machel in Mozambique—the improvement of US relations with black Africa and the reduced Soviet role in the region that stemmed from a Namibian settlement could be early casualties of heightened conflict elsewhere. []

25X1

If an Indeterminate Outcome Occurs. Namibia settlement efforts would not automatically collapse if, despite agreement on all aspects of the UN plan, a mutually acceptable formula for a Cuban withdrawal continued to elude the negotiators. South Africa would not agree easily, however, to ignore its self-imposed deadline for a settlement in order to give the Contact Group extra time to find ways around the impasse on the Cuban issue. South African officials have stated publicly that the Namibian issue must be settled now, since the burden of supporting Namibia has become intolerable, and that elections will be held next March or April regardless of whether SWAPO or the UN participates. The Botha government has in effect promised its public a resolution of the Namibia problem "one way or the other" within the next year. To renege on this commitment, Pretoria might demand some gestures of good will from the United States, moves which could strengthen African perceptions of deepening US involvement with Pretoria. []

25X1

Moreover, if Pretoria was unable to get its way on the Cuban issue, it might back away from its concessions on the UN plan; the South Africans stated in May, in fact, that their acceptance of key points of the UN plan was contingent upon the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. Pretoria's disavowal of previous concessions—or stubbornness on any minor outstanding issue—would leave the South Africans vulnerable to charges of bad faith from the black African states, which have never accepted linkage in the first place. Some Contact Group members that have only reluctantly supported linkage—France, Canada, and perhaps West Germany—might join those accusing

25X1

Secret

Secret

South Africa of sabotaging the negotiations. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Consequently, we believe that an indeterminate outcome to the current round of talks—essentially an agreement by all parties to put the UN plan on ice pending a breaking of the impasse on the Cuban issue—would be a difficult enterprise. The war would continue, of course, and any new escalation could substantially complicate Contact Group efforts to resolve the Cuban issue. [REDACTED]

If Negotiations Fail. If US-Angolan talks on the withdrawal of Cubans appear fruitless after a few more months, we believe the South Africans will begin implementing an “internal” settlement. Although the Contact Group has stated repeatedly that the West will not recognize elections that exclude SWAPO or the UN, Pretoria probably would expect some degree of support from the West, claiming that South Africa should not be held responsible for the “recalcitrance” of the black Africans. [REDACTED]

Collapse of the negotiations probably would lead Pretoria to conduct military operations of unprecedented scope in southern Angola. Foreign Minister Botha recently warned that the South African Government “could see itself required” to launch such attacks if its 15 August deadline is not met. One diplomatic report, however, indicates that the South Africans recently extended their self-imposed deadline by another month into September. [REDACTED]

As ardent admirers of Israeli strategic tactics—Foreign Minister Pik Botha recently drew parallels between Israel in Lebanon and South Africa in Angola—the South Africans, in our view, would intend to inflict a humiliating defeat on SWAPO and punish its Angolan and Cuban backers as a first step toward proceeding with an “internal” settlement. [REDACTED]

A more remote, but still plausible, possibility is that Pretoria might seek militarily to create a de facto partition of Angola through increased support to Savimbi’s insurgency—a new “reality” it would hope to convince the West to ratify. Pretoria may see benefit in strengthened UNITA control over a larger part of Angola, which would serve as a buffer for a Namibia that became independent under strictly South African auspices. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

The area Savimbi currently controls in southeastern Angola is for the most part sparsely populated “bush” country. UNITA uses it as a rear base for its main theater of operation in central Angola—the country’s agricultural and population heartland that is Savimbi’s Ovimbundu tribal home. South Africa could help him expand his base by turning over to UNITA much of the territory it currently controls north of the Namibian border, but this probably would not create a viable “state” for Savimbi because it would leave Angolan-Cuban defenses intact along the Mocamedes rail line. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

While the South Africans probably could attack successfully at several points along the Mocamedes line, we believe that it would be extremely difficult even for a combined UNITA and South African force to dislodge the Cubans and Angolans from the Mocamedes-to-Menongue line and hold these gains against likely counterattacks. The South Africans, however, may have exaggerated estimates of UNITA’s strength—Foreign Minister Botha claimed recently that Savimbi had 22,000 trained troops with 3,000

25X1

25X1

Secret

Secret

more expected by the end of the year—and may believe that such an ambitious undertaking is within UNITA capabilities.

25X1

In any case, Prime Minister Botha has said repeatedly that he will proceed with elections, with or without an international settlement; fear of adverse domestic political reactions may make him keep his promise. South African imposition of an “internal” settlement, unadorned by even desultory negotiations and coupled with increased support for Savimbi, undoubtedly would provoke stronger anti-Western sentiment in the black African states, including more uncooperative behavior in international bodies, calls for mandatory sanctions against South Africa, and possibly anti-US demonstrations. Pretoria’s neighbors probably would become more receptive to Soviet blandishments in anticipation of more aggressive South African military and covert actions. In the increased regional instability that we believe would ensue from a South African move toward a unilateral solution to the Namibian problem, the United States probably would be widely viewed as South Africa’s “silent partner.”

25X1

Secret

Page Denied

Secret

25X1

Appendix


25X1

**Recent Military
Developments**

25X1

25X1

Since mid-July, South Africa has conducted air and ground attacks at probable SWAPO/Angola targets deep in southern Angola. It has also augmented its equipment, supplies, and troops in northern Namibia to a level that will allow it to conduct larger operations in Angola with little warning. [REDACTED]

**Air Buildup
and Strikes in Angola**

base. The South Africans encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire and one Puma was shot down, killing 15 men. On the following day it discovered and destroyed another SWAPO base near Cuvelai. [REDACTED]


Pretoria has publicly admitted the loss of its helicopter and 14 additional personnel during the current operation, which it claimed began in June. It also claims to have killed 418 guerrillas and captured a large cache of Soviet-made arms in operations ranging as far north as Techumatete. As of 12 August, South Africa said that the operation was still under way. [REDACTED]

25X1

In late July, Angola publicly charged that South African Mirage jets attacked its facilities at Cahama on 21 July, and Cahama, Jamba, and Mulondo on 26 July. [REDACTED]

**Increased Ground Operations**

According to [REDACTED] the US defense attache in Pretoria, South Africa attacked a SWAPO base at Mupa on 22 July. The source claims that the operation continued as South African units tracked the retreating guerrillas to bases north of Cuvelai. This led to a significant battle on 9 August in which South Africa, using heavy Mirage F-1 air support and troops inserted by Puma helicopters, attacked a more-than-300-man SWAPO guerrilla



25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

25X1

Operation Protea in August-September 1981, South Africa established small bases at Xangango and Ngiva to support aggressive patrolling-in-force throughout the area. [REDACTED]

25X1

We believe that these patrols have operated across the Cunene River as far north as Cahama, but their activities have been limited by South Africa's destruction of the bridge crossing the river at Xangango and by the limited size of the South African force. We also believe that small units have routinely ranged beyond Evale in the north and beyond Anhanca in the east. Before July, South Africa maintained approximately a 500-man presence in this zone and supported it with light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters as well as with ground convoys from Namibia. [REDACTED]

25X1

Angolan Defenses

Luanda's key defenses against South African attacks in southern Angola consist of a string of major garrisons along the Mocamedes-to-Menongue railway and a loose network of smaller garrisons to the south but above the area South Africa has dominated in southern Angola since August 1981. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Zone of Control

Before its most recent operations, South Africa had dominated an arc-shaped area about 100 km deep in southern Angola. After securing this area during

Secret

Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

Secret

Secret